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Energy policy has historically played an important role in 
the development of the European Union (EU). This study 
examines the reasons for the choice of coal and atomic energy 
as the bases for constructing community institutions of 
governance and analyzes their successes and failures as 
functional areas of integration. 
Functionalist theory has provided the ideological 
foundations for the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community. Functionalist 
theorists advocate technocracy as the means for overcoming 
the conflicts inherent in traditional political processes. Coal 
and atomic energy were chosen as regimes of integration 
because of their technocratic character and the importance 
attached to them, respectively, as the dominant energy source 
of the time and the perceived source of energy abundance in 
the proximate future. This vision of a process of technical 
integration paving the way for political union was predicated 
on the assumption that the political and technical functions of 
governance could and should be separated. In fact, energy 
regimes could not be removed from the political context of 
national governance. Hard energy regimes, which include coal 
and atomic energy, are technocratic polities which exclude 
ordinary citizens from the exercise of power and intensify 
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bestowed on the institutions of the EC a technocratic character and made it 
difficult for them to claim political legitimacy.  
 
Keywords: European integration history, European institutions, 
European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC, European Atomic Energy 




Any review of the development of the international politics through time 
would not fail to notice the continual increase of organization of the global 
political system. This increase in organization, or integration, is primarily 
discerned in the increase in the number of formal international organizations 
but also in the enhancement of their influence, scope and activities (Panke 
and Starkmann, 2020). The continuing integration of the international 
political system, however, is also expressed by the changing attitudes of 
peoples, among whom new senses of community develop. The evolution of 
such attitudes legitimates international organizations (Tallberg and Zürn, 
2019). While this process may not be smooth, may be subject to occasional 
reversals, and may not even be of a uniform character, it is clearly occurring. 
This fact has not escaped political theorists who, increasingly, have focused 
their attention to the phenomenon of international integration (Paul, 2012; 
Viotti and Kauppi, 1987, pp. 205-213). 
International organizations can be considered the nodes of international 
integration. They are the focal points for the complex processes through 
which integration takes place. Among the multitude of international 
organizations, the European Union (EU) stands out as the most integrated 
system of states. This conclusion can be reached irrespective of the definition 
or measure of integration used. As such, the EU is an interesting and 
valuable case on which to base the study of the processes and forces which 
constitute international political integration (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999; 
Caporaso, 1974: 2). The European Union is important as a subject of study 
because it offers a unique setting for the application and refinement of 
analytical tools for the study of integration. It is also an important subject of 
study because its existence and path of development has a profound impact 
on the lives of the close to 450 million citizens of its member states. 
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We have chosen to study the process of integration in the European 
Union by focusing on developments in a policy area: energy. We have taken 
this approach because of the historical importance of energy policy, 
particularly coal and nuclear energy policy, to the evolution of the Union. 
Our objective is to analyse the reasons which compelled the founders of the 
EU to choose energy in general, and coal and nuclear energy specifically, as 
the policy area upon which to base the foundational structures (institutions, 
treaties, rules/norms) of the Union. We will also investigate the ways in 
which this choice affected the subsequent development of the EU. 
 
2. Post-World War II attempts for the European integration 
 
Although attempts at political integration of Europe can be traced as far 
back as the late middle ages (Hadjilambrinos, 2018), the devastation wrought 
upon the continent by World War II created a strong impetus for the 
establishment of supranational European institutions that could prevent 
such an event from happening again. This impetus for integration 
manifested itself in numerous civil society organizations that emerged with a 
mission to promote the process of integration. These included the Union of 
European Federalists, La Ligue Européenne de Coopération Economique, 
(both established in 1946), the United European Movement and the 
European Parliamentary Union (both established in 1947), to name just a 
few. The political activism of these organizations led to several treaties and 
formal organizations. These included the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk between 
the U.K. and France, which ostensibly was to counter future German 
aggression but in reality it was to unite the two countries against the Soviet 
threat (Trachtenberg, 1999), the 1948 Treaty of Brussels, which, essentially, 
expanded the Dunkirk Treaty to include Belgium, The Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg (Duke, 2000), and the 1949 Treaty of London, which created the 
Council of Europe (Gurrieri, 2014). 
The Dunkirk and Brussels treaties represented a dead-end in deeper 
European integration as they were supplanted by the 1949 Treaty of 
Washington, which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Even though NATO incorporated governance structures such as a 
secretariat, a group of permanent representatives meeting at least weekly as 
the North Atlantic Council, and, even, a Parliamentary Assembly, several 
factors precluded the organization from meaningful action as a single body. 
These factors included the clear predominance of a single country—the 
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United States, the requirement for unanimity for any decision, and the ability 
of any member state to exclude itself from any NATO action (Beer, 1969; 
Kaplan, 1954). In any case, NATO was established as a defence alliance, with 
almost no political integrative agenda (Kaplan, 1954). 
In contrast to NATO, the Council of Europe embodied the hope that it 
would promote political integration in Europe. The organization was 
negotiated at the Congress of Europe, which, in 1948, brought together 
almost 750 leading politicians, government representatives, and members of 
civil society (including Winston Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, François 
Mitterrand, Altiero Spinelli, and Paul Reynaud among others). Two 
competing ideologies about integration emerged in the discussions: 
intergovernmentalism, which favoured the creation of a classical 
international organization comprised of representatives of national 
governments and federalism, which favoured a political forum made up of 
parliamentarians from the member states. In the end, the Treaty of London, 
which was signed on May 5, 1949, represented a compromise, weighted 
more on the side of intergovernmentalism: 
―The role of the… Assembly was strongly reduced by the intergovern-
mental element, the Committee of Ministers, [which became] the main 
decision-making body. The Statute of the Council of Europe even denied the 
Assembly the right to decide its agenda, as the Committee of Ministers was 
given the task to approve it‖. (Guerrieri, 2014, p. 222). 
The deliberations at the Congress of Europe revealed the deep divide 
between the intergovernmental and federalist camps. The two were even 
represented by separate, and rival, European parliamentary groups: the 
federalist European Parliamentary Union, which had been founded by 
Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1947, and the intergovernmental 
United Europe Movement, which had been created by Winston Churchill 
and his son-in-law Duncan Sandys (Guerrieri, 2014). A third approach 
evolved, not to bridge, but rather to circumvent the conflicts apparently 
inherent in the direct attempt at integration (which immediately targeted 
political union) that seemed to inevitably become entangled in the political 
process (Monnet, 1978, pp. 289-298; Schwarz, 1975, pp. 14-15). This approach 
sought to achieve integration in a narrow policy area, making it easier for 
nation states to cede some of their sovereignty to a supranational institution. 
The idea was that, as integration in the original narrow policy area 
deepened, policy spill-over would require it to also be broadened to adjacent 
policy areas. This approach was termed ―functionalism‖ (Haas, 1964). 
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3. Energy policy as a functional area for European integration 
 
The narrow policy area (functional area) chosen to build the first 
supranational institutions for Europe comprised of the closely linked 
economic sectors of coal and steel. In fact, Europe‘s coal industry was the 
first to be targeted for a common management regime with the creation, 
immediately after the war, of the European Coal Organization (ECO), which 
first met on May 18, 1945—11 days after Germany‘s surrender to the Allies—
and which was formalized on January 1, 1946 (CVCE, 2020). 
Coal was a critically important resource in the aftermath of World War II 
because the continent‘s economy was heavily dependent on it. Though 
statistics do not exist for some years after the war, before the war 90% of 
primary energy in Europe came from coal. In 1950, coal still provided 75% of 
the Community's energy requirements (Evans, 1979, p. 40). This situation did 
not change significantly until after 1957 (Lucas, 1977, pp. 1-2). The disruption 
to labour, as well as the production and distribution infrastructure caused by 
the war made a coordinated approach to rebuilding the industry a matter of 
survival (CVCE, 2020). 
Steel was also a very important resource for post-war Europe. Steel 
supplies were necessary for rebuilding Europe‘s industrial capacity and 
transportation networks. They were even important for rebuilding housing 
for the continent‘s people, especially in urban centres that had been severely 
damaged by the war. Furthermore, Europe‘s steel industry was closely 
linked to the coal industry as steel manufacture requires coal and ownership 
of coal mines and steel production plants was often in the hands of the same 
companies (Lucas, 1977). 
When the Council of Europe‘s Committee of Ministers refused to act on 
the resolution of the organization‘s Parliamentary Assembly for the creation 
of a European Political Authority (Res 2, September 1, 1949), as well as on the 
Assembly‘s recommendation for the transition to a bi-cameral European 
Parliament which would fold in both the Assembly and the Committee of 
Ministers in a body with some real legislative authority (Recommendation 
54, November 23, 1950), it became clear that the Council of Europe would not 
become a vehicle for the political integration of Europe (Sithole, 2013). If the 
process of integration were to continue moving toward a structure with 
some real political authority, some new proposal would have to be put 
forward. This proposal came from France: the Schuman Plan for the creation 
of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
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Unlike any of the previous plans, treaties, and organizations, which we 
discussed briefly above, the Schuman Plan had both a narrower objective 
and deeper focus. The narrowness was both in the scope of competencies 
and in the geographic reach of the proposed organization. Not only was the 
ECSC to have control of only two specific economic sectors (the coal and 
steel industries), but it only needed to include two countries: France and 
(West) Germany. While other European countries were invited to participate, 
the organization‘s creation was not contingent on any other country‘s 
participation (Monnet, 1978, pp. 295-296). The depth in focus was manifested 
in the proposal‘s design of an institution which would assume direct and full 
control of participating nations‘ coal and steel industries. Jean Monnet, who 
at the time was Commissioner of France‘s central planning organization, 
conceived and drafted the plan, and presented it to France‘s foreign minister, 
Schuman, to officially put forward. Monnet‘s original draft of his proposal to 
Schuman concluded with a passage that states the proposed organization‘s 
objectives clearly and succinctly: 
―This proposal has an essential political objective: to make a breach in the 
ramparts of national sovereignty which will be narrow enough to secure 
consent, but deep enough to open the way towards the unity that is essential 
to peace‖. (Monnet, 1978, p. 296) 
The proposed European Coal and Steel Community would go on to 
succeed where previous attempts at European political integration had 
failed. Its success lay in its design but also in the specific problems it 
addressed. 
The year 1950 did not only signify the end of the hope that the Council of 
Europe would become the seed for an overarching federal structure with 
some real political authority. It also signified a significant intensification of 
the Cold War and brought forth the spectre of armed conflict between 
Eastern and Western Europe. With the U.S.S.R. successfully testing an atom 
bomb on August 29, 1949—and the fact of the Soviet Union having nuclear 
weapons announced publicly by U.S. president Truman on September 23, 
1949—the potential impact of such a war was terrifying. The conducting of 
free elections in 1949 also established the inevitability of West Germany 
assuming sovereign control of the territory hitherto occupied by the three 
western allies (the U.S.A., France, and the U.K.). Furthermore, the 
establishment of NATO made clear the intent by the U.S.A. to engage 
western European countries in a military built up to counter the Soviet 
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threat. Consequently, the re-building of West Germany‘s military was an 
almost foregone conclusion (Soutou, 2001). 
These facts were especially salient for France, which was concerned both 
about German military resurgence and access to Germany‘s coal and 
industrial resources. After all, France had fought three major wars with 
Germany in the span of less than 80 years. In the conclusion of the third—
World War II—it made sure that it secured access to the resources necessary 
for its own reconstruction by establishing the Saar Protectorate, which was 
under its direct control, and by being able to exert influence in the Ruhr 
region through the allied-controlled International Authority for the Ruhr. 
The re-establishment of German sovereignty was seen by France as a major 
threat to its interests (Soutou, 2001). 
Monnet, in fact, developed his proposal for a Coal and Steel Community 
primarily as a solution to France‘s dilemma at the prospect of Germany‘s 
political and military rebirth (Monnet, 1978, pp. 288-316). Coal and steel held 
both real and symbolic value for the two countries: 
―The joint resources of France and Germany lay essentially in their coal 
and steel, distributed unevenly but in complementary fashion over a 
triangular area artificially divided by historical frontiers. With the industrial 
revolution, which had coincided with the rise of doctrinal nationalism, these 
frontiers had become barriers to trade and then lines of confrontation. 
Neither country now felt secure unless it commanded all the resources—i.e., 
all the area. Their rival claims were decided by war, which solved the 
problem only for a time—the time to prepare for revenge. Coal and steel 
were at once the key to economic power and the raw materials for forging 
weapons of war. This double role gave them immense symbolic significance, 
now largely forgotten, but comparable at the time to that of nuclear energy 
today. To pool them across frontiers would reduce their malign prestige and 
turn them instead into a guarantee of peace‖. (Monnet, 1978, p. 293).  
The relationship between energy, industrial development, and 
international conflict might have manifested most strongly between France 
and Germany in Europe in 1950, but it is a relationship that transcends both 
space and time. Placing the coal and steel industries under the control of a 
supranational organization was, therefore, appealing to other countries as 
well. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg accepted the 
invitation of French foreign minister Schuman to join France and West 
Germany in the negotiations and on April 18, 1951 these six countries signed 
the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 
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Monnet‘s original idea, embodied in the Schuman Plan, included only 
two institutions: a High Authority with full power to make decisions about 
the member states‘ coal and steel industries and a Consultative Committee, 
which would advise the High Authority and serve as a conduit for dialogue 
between it and the industries it was to control. The Committee was to be 
made up of representatives from labor unions and trade/industrial 
associations to be selected by those constituencies and not national 
governments. During the negotiations, however, a further three institutions 
were added: a Parliamentary Assembly (whose members were to be selected 
by the national assemblies of the member states), a Court of Justice, and a 
Ministerial Committee (whose members would be delegates of the national 
governments with ministerial rank). The Assembly and Court were included 
as a result of pressure from the European Federalist movement. And the 
Ministerial Committee was insisted upon by Belgium and the Netherlands 
(Hadjilambrinos, 2019). 
Despite the inclusion of these three institutions, the High Authority 
retained almost exclusive policymaking power. In matters in which it was 
given authority by the Treaty (setting production quotas for coal and steel, 
setting tariffs to coal and steel imports from outside the Community, creating 
a common market for these commodities), its decisions were binding and 
immediately enforceable in the member states. The Treaty specified that the 
High Authority was to be comprised of nine members. Eight were to be 
nominated by individual member states while the ninth, who was to be the 
body‘s president, was to be nominated by the other eight. The body was to 
be appointed en bloc by the governments of the member states, acting 
through the Committee of Ministers (Spierenburg and Poidevin, 1994, pp. 43-
66). 
Only a decision by the Court of Justice could have an impact on the High 
Authority‘s decisions. The Assembly‘s only real power was to be able to 
dismiss the High Authority en bloc. Otherwise, its function was to propose 
matters for consideration by the High Authority and the Committee of 
Ministers. The Committee of Ministers only had authority in areas outside 
the jurisdiction of the High Authority. Its principal role was to harmonize 
actions by the national governments in areas that were affected by the 
establishment of the common market in coal and steel (Hadjilambrinos, 
2019). 
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4. The ECSC as springboard for further integration 
 
When the Paris Treaty came into force on July 23, 1952, Europe was still in 
the grip of the post-war energy shortage. Coal, accounting for 74 percent of 
the energy supply of the six original member states, was in short supply and 
expensive (Hallstein, 1973, pp. 215-216). Apart from its federalist goals, the 
ECSC was meant to accomplish: 
―...not only the removal of trade barriers—both customs and quotas—and 
the elimination of all forms of price discrimination, in transport as well as in 
the basic products, but also ensuring fair and undistorted competition under 
strict rules, by removing both private and governmental restrictions, so that 
the common market led to increased supplies and lower prices‖. (Palmer and 
Lambert, 1968, p. 266) 
These goals were technical and economic in nature, designed to increase 
the productive efficiency of the industries under its jurisdiction (coal and 
steel) and, therefore, were consistent with the prevailing national interests of 
the member states—increased energy and other commodity supplies, price 
stability, and increasing employment. Additionally, the ultimate functional 
objectives of the ECSC, increased supplies and lower prices, were clearly 
consistent with the ideological foundation of the national energy sectors, as 
their attainment provided the means for increased coal consumption. 
The perception of the people and the governments of the member states 
that energy was scarce and expensive lasted through 1956 and 1957. In 1956, 
the Second Arab-Israeli War and the invasion by the U.K. and France of the 
Canal Zone, resulted in the closure of the Suez Canal. At that time about two 
thirds of Western Europe‘s oil supply passed through the Canal (Yergin, 
2009, p. 462). Its closure, which lasted until March 1957, heightened the 
perception of energy scarcity and led the High Authority to plan further 
increases in coal-mining capacity (Lucas, 1977, p. 29). These conditions 
facilitated the completion of the single market in coal (Palmer and Lambert, 
1968, pp. 267-268) because they permitted the ECSC to operate within the 
same parameters as the national energy regimes. In other words, the ECSC 
appeared to be able to meet its member states‘ energy requirements as well, 
if not better than their national regimes had done: it allowed national coal 
industries to expand (thus promoting security of supplies and employment), 
it produced more and cheaper coal, and it adhered to the same ideological 
principles of technocratic control, efficiency, and increased energy 
consumption. 
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This enabled policymakers to continue with the establishment of new 
supranational regimes, based on the ECSC model. The first proposals were, 
again, a direct attempt for political union. The governments of the six ECSC 
member states negotiated and, in 1952, signed a treaty to establish a 
European Defence Community (EDC). Also, in 1952, the ECSC 
Parliamentary Assembly presented a proposal for a European Political 
Community, which would join the EDC and ECSC, would have a Parliament 
directly elected by the people, and a Senate appointed by the national 
parliaments. When the French parliament failed to ratify the EDC treaty, it 
became clear that direct political integration was still premature. Jean 
Monnet decided that the indirect approach, of first integrating functional 
areas of the national economies would still be the only approach with a 
chance to succeed. 
The success of the ECSC gave him the impetus to continue moving in that 
direction. In 1955, he created the Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe, bringing together union leaders and the heads of the Christian-
Democrat, Liberal, and Socialist political parties of the six ECSC member 
states. His belief was that conditions were ripe for the expansion of 
community institutions to promote independent European development of 
atomic energy: ―The United States of Europe means: a federal power lined to 
the peaceful exploitation of atomic energy‖ (Monnet, 1955). 
Monnet‘s idea for the creation of a European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) was based in the belief that coal would continue to remain the 
prime energy source for European industry for several years into the future, 
and that nuclear power would be available in time to replace it. Continuing 
increases in the demand for energy made the expansion of coal production 
possible. The role of the ECSC in this climate of continuously increasing 
energy consumption was to regulate prices and control the coal producing 
cartels, to maintain a steady and ―fairly‖ priced coal supply for its six 
member states. This role was not seriously challenged by anyone since the 
cartels were mostly German and the government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany had committed itself to free market policies. While atomic energy 
was an area in which the ECSC six had very little activity, Monnet believed 
that, sooner or later, they would need to either catch up to the United States 
and the Soviet Union or be left behind. Pursuing independent and conflicting 
national atomic energy development policies would repeat the errors of the 
past that the ECSC had been trying to address since its inception (Monnet, 
1978, pp. 400-446). 
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Even before the establishment of the Action Committee for the United 
States of Europe, Monnet had discussed his ideas with French political 
leaders and with Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium‘s Foreign minister. Spaak 
convinced him that an atomic energy community would not be feasible 
outside a broader European common market, and they worked together to 
draft a proposal for both. After obtaining the agreement of the governments 
of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as that of France, on 
May 1955, Spaak presented this proposal for a European Atomic Energy 
Community and a European Economic Community under the name 
―Memorandum from the Benelux Countries to the six ECSC Countries‖. This 
memorandum was to serve as the basis of negotiations among the six at the 
Messina Conference in early June 1955 (Monnet, 1978, pp. 402-404). At the 
end of that conference, the governments of the six countries authorized an 
intergovernmental committee to put forth a concrete proposal for 
institutions, competencies, and processes for the establishment of a common 
market designed to move toward complete economic integration. Paul-Henri 
Spaak was appointed to lead this committee, which, on April 21, 1956 
produced a report proposing the establishment of two new communities: a 
European Economic Community (EEC), and a European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM). 
The so-called ―Spaak Report‖ incorporated the lessons on international 
cooperation learned through the experience of the ECSC and suggested a 
process that was tenable: 
―The guiding principle behind the Spaak Report was to answer the simple 
question of what the member states should do to promote European 
economic integration. The experts succeeded in providing theoretically 
simple answers that were above all capable of being put into practice. The 
Report set out a comprehensive structure of aims and means that was based 
only to a limited extent on theories of integration. Instead it relied more on 
the practical experience of international co-operation and generally 
recognized values and principles of economic practice. It proposed that an 
overall integration of the economy should be the aim except for the atomic 
energy sector, for which a separate organization was to be created. The 
experience of the Coal and Steel Community showed that the process of 
partial integration had already reached the limits of its possibilities within 
only a few years and could therefore no longer provide a new impetus for 
the aim of overall integration. Economic integration would only hold 
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promise for the future if it were not just individual sectors but the whole of 
the economy that was included‖. (Küsters, 1989, pp. 85-86) 
Energy had an important position in the Spaak Report, not only because 
of the suggested creation of an organization which would direct the 
development of nuclear energy in Europe but also because of the concern 
over gas and electricity. In its last section, considering specific sectors for 
which action in ―vertical integration‖ would be required, the report 
identified the need for comprehensive planning for electricity (produced 
mainly in coal-fired plants) and coal-based gas production (Lucas, 1977, pp. 
14-15). The objective of the energy provisions of the report was not only the 
promotion of a nuclear industry in Europe, but also the facilitating of a 
smooth transition of the whole economy from a coal to a nuclear base (Lucas, 
1977, p. 14). 
 
5. EURATOM: High hope and disappointment 
 
The Action Committee for the United States of Europe, headed by 
Monnet, played an important role in the negotiations that followed the Spaak 
Report and which, eventually, resulted in the Treaties of Rome establishing 
the EEC and EURATOM. The Committee‘s objective for a supranational 
atomic energy regime was to create the conditions for the development and 
exploitation of this form of energy in Europe while ensuring that the 
community of nations participating in the process remained free of nuclear 
weapons. This objective was supported by all six ECSC member states, albeit 
with important reservations on the part of France. These reservations 
ultimately became the source of conflict between France and its partners, and 
this conflict resulted in the ultimate demise of the EURATOM regime. 
Because of the relative scarcity of indigenous energy resources, France 
looked upon nuclear energy as the means to remain a major power, both in 
the socioeconomic and military sense (Camilleri, 1984, pp.18-20). Alone of all 
six ECSC partners negotiating the EURATOM treaty, France was firmly 
committed to the development of military nuclear applications. Although 
this commitment was never affirmed publicly during the negotiations, the 
position of the French was that while the proposed Atomic Energy 
Community should be assigned the task of promoting the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, it should have no authority to interfere with efforts by the 
member states to develop nuclear weapons (Polach, 1964, pp. 63-65). The 
National Assembly, even over the objections of the prime minister Guy 
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Mollet, was determined to protect France‘s right to pursue her national 
atomic program and produce and use atomic weapons for national security 
(Ballet, 1956).  
France saw in EURATOM an opportunity to advance its national 
objectives and showed a great degree of interest in its establishment, but only 
if the Community could be organized on France's terms (Camilleri, 1984, p. 
33; Polach, 1964, p. 64). France was determined to use EURATOM to 
promote the independent development of its own civilian nuclear program. 
It also wanted to insulate the programs of the other Community members 
from the prospect of domination by the U.S. or the U.K.: 
―The more comprehensive and systematic approach to nuclear policy 
adopted by the French state combined with the more explicitly nationalist 
formulation of military, economic and technological objectives to produce a 
distinctively French attitude to the question of European institutions... The 
French concept of integration was inspired not only by the vision of 
European independence vis á vis the United States but also by the desire to 
secure France‘s own lines of reactor development and to create a western 
European market for the emerging French atomic program‖. (Camilleri, 
1984, pp. 30-31) 
In addition, the French, always afraid of German development, especially 
in areas of military significance, considered the proposed supranational 
atomic energy regime as a means of monitoring and maintaining some level 
of control on German atomic development. Though not openly 
acknowledged, this was perhaps the most important reason that France 
supported EURATOM monopoly and ownership of nuclear materials for 
civilian uses (while sternly opposing such authority over military nuclear 
materials) (Polach, 1964, p. 66; Ballet, 1956).  
All these concerns of France were based on the conception that any 
nuclear regime should be able to promote both the Community's and the 
nation's security. The nuclear industry‘s ability to be a possible direct 
supplier of weapons for national defence placed obvious limitations on its 
supranational scope. The supranational regime could only be allowed to 
concern itself with the promotion of the Community‘s energy security 
through the development of the characteristics common to all hard energy 
regimes (a cheap, abundant energy resource, secure from outside 
interference). These concerns, however, isolated France from its Community 
partners. The predominance of national security considerations, the pursuit 
of national prestige, and the continued anxiety over Germany breached the 
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ideological foundations of the process of integration that EURATOM was 
supposed to promote. From its gestation, the new Community was beset by 
suspicion (Bupp and Derian, 1978, pp. 24-26). 
In contrast to France‘s strong and explicit interests in EURATOM, the five 
other ECSC states were more interested in the creation of a Common Market 
and the creation of supranational institutions than in the provisions of the 
proposed atomic community. Furthermore, while none, at the time, viewed 
nuclear energy with disfavour, they were not nearly as committed to nuclear 
energy as France was (Küsters, 1989, pp. 87-91). Germany, for example, 
regarded nuclear research to close the perceived ―technology gap‖ between 
itself and the U.S.A. in not only nuclear, but also electronics, material, and 
quality control technologies (Lucas, 1985, pp. 197-198). The consequence of 
this was that the five made concessions to French demands on the 
EURATOM treaty in order to gain French approval of the EEC treaty. As a 
result, EURATOM was denied any control over military nuclear programs, 
was never invested with any authority over the national utility industries, 
nor over national energy policy-making institutions. The only effective 
means for implementing its objectives was research, and even there its power 
remained limited by the requirement for unanimous decisions (Camilleri, 
1984, p. 33). 
This is not to say that EURATOM did not possess some extensive powers. 
Its objectives included the establishment of a nuclear common market and it 
was given the authority to establish common standards for nuclear 
technology, to promote investment in nuclear power projects, and even to 
promote and participate in common nuclear enterprises (Polach, 1964, pp. 
73-95). The member states were supposed to transfer their bilateral foreign 
nuclear agreements to EURATOM which was given the authority to 
negotiate subsequent agreements for the Community as a whole in order to 
be able to coordinate a common nuclear policy (Polach, 1964, pp. 96-98). 
Finally, EURATOM possessed the power to control all fissile materials not 
intended for military purposes through its joint Supply Agency (Polach, 
1964, pp. 76-85). The position of France during the negotiations for the Treaty 
may have weakened EURATOM, but the goal of establishing a supranational 
nuclear regime still seemed possible. 
Conflict among France and its five partners, however, continued after the 
establishment of EURATOM. The Community and the member states except 
for France promoted the use of U.S.A. nuclear technologies (Bupp and 
Derian, 1978, pp. 27-29). The French accused the other member states of 
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purposely bypassing French nuclear techniques and depending on outside 
(namely U.S.A.) expertise rather than on indigenous, Community 
technologies. The other countries accused France of being interested in the 
Community ―only as a means of expanding her own atomic plans‖ (Polach, 
1964, p. 129). Being suspicious of French aims and, also distrusting the ability 
of the Community to meet their own national objectives in as satisfactory a 
way as their national energy industries, they refused to transfer their 
bilateral nuclear agreements to EURATOM. 
Like the rest of the hard energy regimes, the nuclear regime had serious 
implications for national industrial, economic and military power and 
prestige. Because of the possibility for direct military applications, and the 
image of nuclear weapons as the ultimate weapons, the hard regime 
characteristics of the nuclear regime were even more pronounced. While 
these characteristics gave the regime its appeal as a functional area for 
political integration, they, at the same time, made it impossible for it to play 
its intended role because they gave rise to the strongest nationalist 
aspirations. Having been weakened at its inception by the preoccupation of 
France with its own international status, EURATOM was beset with conflict 
among the member states arising out of the distrust exhibited by France. 
Within a year of its founding, the Atomic Energy Community's 
significance for European integration had already been seriously impaired as 
member states chose to pursue other options for nuclear development 
(Polach, 1964, p. 115). Having been denied any real power in the area that 
mattered the most (to make plans and set targets for nuclear expansion), it 
was never possible for EURATOM to harmonize ―designs of reactors, 
procedures for licensing, standards of safety and quality control‖ (Lucas, 
1977, p. 42), and was, thus, never able to become a true supranational regime. 
Nuclear development in EURATOM member states remained the 
prerogative of the nation states themselves. This enabled the states to 
maintain varying levels of commitment to nuclear energy and EURATOM. 
By failing in both its direct functional goal (to create a supranational regime 
pursuing a common nuclear energy policy) and its indirect political goal (to 
converge national political governance ideologies and processes, pursuant to 
ultimate political unification), EURATOM failed as a functional regime of 
integration. 
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6. The decline and demise of the ECSC 
 
The Treaties of Rome establishing the EEC and EURATOM were signed 
by the six ECSC member states on March 25, 1957. They were ratified and 
came into force on January 1, 1958. As we have already discussed, these 
developments took place in an environment of expanding economic activity 
and increasing energy demand. This situation drastically changed toward 
the end of 1958. As a global recession, which began in the U.S.A., took hold 
in Europe, industrial activity slackened and this, combined with a mild 
winter, caused the demand for energy to fall for the first time since the war. 
The Suez Canal had already re-opened. The use of large tanker ships and 
pipelines, which had started to become significant at this time, provided new 
venues, not dependent on the Suez, for the transportation of oil to Western 
Europe. The entrance of the Soviet Union into the oil market decreased 
Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Oil became cheaper and its 
supply as dependable as that of coal and, so, its usage continued to increase. 
Along with these trends, the use of imported coal was continued because of 
the long-term contracts already in effect. As a result, ―the effect of the slight 
fall in total energy consumption was amplified many times on the 
indigenous coal industry.‖ (Lucas, 1977, pp. 29-30). 
These developments put the great strain on the ECSC for it was no longer 
able to meet the national demands for coal industry employment protection 
as well or better than national coal regimes. Invoking the powers granted it 
by the treaty to enable it to deal with crisis situations, the ECSC High 
Authority sought to place production quotas on national coal industries as a 
prelude to restructuring them in order to make Community coal competitive 
in the global market. The Council, failing to reach the required unanimous 
agreement, blocked the High Authority from proceeding with these 
measures (Curtis, 1965, p. 143; Palmer and Lambert, 1968, p. 268). As most of 
the coal mines which could remain competitive in the world market after 
reorganization were in West Germany, the High Authority‘s proposal was 
perceived as a threat to other national coal industries. The ECSC was unable 
to provide an acceptable level of security for these industries, and the loss of 
large numbers of jobs in the coal-mining sector raised the prospect of serious 
disturbance to the national economies of Belgium, France, the Netherlands 
and even Germany (Lucas, 1977, pp. 31-33; Curtis, 1965, pp. 143-144).  
The only measure of relief the ECSC could offer within the context of a 
common coal market and industry was the imposition of common barriers to 
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coal and oil imports. This response, however, which was part of the High 
Authority proposal for the restructuring of the coal industry, was contrary to 
the objective of low energy prices. Italy, with no national coal industry to 
speak of, and France, having decided that low oil prices were more 
important to its national economy than protection of its coal industry, were 
against these measures (Lucas, 1977, p. 32).  
In creating the ECSC, the member states‘ governments had expected it to 
meet the ―old‖ national (i.e., security of production, price stability, and 
protection of employment), as well as the ―new‖ super national challenges 
(i.e., market liberalization, expansion of European integration). It was not 
perceived that there could be a serious conflict among them. This failure was 
reflected in both the response to the coal crisis, and the Treaty of Paris itself: 
―Problems of this magnitude were not foreseen when the Treaty was 
drafted, when it seemed essential to avoid delays in production and to 
contribute to general economic expansion. The safeguard clauses in the 
Treaty were available to deal with emergencies, but not with the 
consequences of major structural or economic changes. For the High 
Authority the only long-term solution would be control over appropriate 
structural development, and a concern with specialization and lowering of 
costs rather than with the development of production. But the powers given 
to the ECSC are not appropriate for this, and the Treaty limits very strictly 
the scope for initiative by the institutions‖. (Curtis, 1965, p. 143) 
As the market for indigenous coal contracted and the crisis ensued, the six 
member states reacted in the way that had been customary, unilaterally: each 
one according to its conception of its own interests. The only alternative 
would have been to cede even more power to the supranational institutions 
(i.e., control over appropriate development of the coal industry), and this 
they were unwilling to do (Lucas, 1977, p. 33). 
While the conflict of interest among France and Italy on one side, and 
Belgium and Germany on the other was indeed a factor in preventing 
common action, the fact that Germany also voted in the Council of Ministers 
against the application of Article 58 of the Treaty which provided for the 
establishment of production quotas and quantitative restrictions on imports 
by the High Authority, means that the primary factor was concern over 
interference with what were perceived as sovereign affairs. National energy 
industries (coal and petroleum, insofar as the High Authority‘s proposals 
would have affected oil prices) were considered too critical for the ECSC to 
be permitted a controlling role. The extraordinarily high importance attached 
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to energy industries by the national governments is highlighted by the 
response to the crisis in the steel sector. In 1962-1963, the steel industry of the 
Six faced a crisis with characteristics very similar to those of the previous 
coal crisis. Although national interests were divergent and agreement could 
not be reached in the Council, the High Authority was able to assert in full 
the powers granted it by the Treaty to raise tariffs and set quotas against 
imports from outside the Community (Curtis, 1965, pp. 145-146). 
The responses of the national governments of France and Germany in 
particular, make it evident that they lacked an unequivocal commitment to 
the ECSC. While this lack of ideological commitment was critical, it is at least 
conceivable that had the supranational regime been able to appeal directly to 
the citizens of the Community, it might have been able to challenge the 
position of the national governments. The political accountability and 
political legitimacy of the ECSC, however, were not commensurable with the 
authority relegated to it. Its structure provided no means for the citizens of 
the member states to have access to the policy-making process. The 
Assembly was not elected directly and, in any case, had no effective powers 
other than to dismiss the High Authority. The Consultative Committee 
which was supposed to provide a ―stimulus to interest groups to participate 
directly in Community discussions, from which support for policy proposals 
would flow,‖ never played a significant role (Wallace et al., 1977, pp. 42-43), 
being limited to an advisory capacity and having no power to influence the 
High Authority. 
In having been designed primarily as a technocratic regime, the ECSC 
was not responsive to the needs of various political constituencies and did 
not have any means of directly appealing to them. The groups adversely 
affected by the crisis were not able to have their voice heard by the High 
Authority, and, in any case, were not accustomed to pursuing this venue. 
Thus, it should not be surprising that they directed their request for relief 
action to national governments who, since they could refuse to implement its 
policies, had the only effective means to control the High Authority. As a 
result, the national governments maintained their monopoly as 
representatives of the interests of their citizens. Finally, it should not be 
surprising at all that, as the situation devolved into a conflict between the 
High Authority and the Council, the ECSC was not able to pursue a 
coordinated policy. 
As the Community was deprived by the national governments of any 
means of direct action for the solution of the problems of the coal market, the 
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supranational coal regime was effectively destroyed. The common coal 
market disappeared in short time, the concept of a common coal industry 
became meaningless, and the High Authority was allowed to exercise the 
supranational powers conferred on it by the Treaty only when it could obtain 
the consent of the member states. Subsequently the role of the ECSC has been 
limited to coordinating efforts to alleviate the social effects of restructuring of 
national coal industries, funding research, and receiving information on 
national policy initiatives with only limited ability to influence decisions in 
this area (Wallace et al., 1977, pp. 179-181). 
In response to the coal crisis, the High Authority was able to only take 
actions which isolated national coal industries from one-another, in effect 
resurrecting the national coal regimes. Following the crisis, it (and, after the 
merging of the three Communities, the Commission) continued efforts to 
remove trade barriers for coal such as restrictive practices and national 
subsidies. It had very limited success in this endeavour, and the common 
market for coal did not re-emerge (Nugent, 1989, p. 35). Ultimately, the Paris 
Treaty could expire in 2002, and the ECSC ceased to exist in any form. 
 
7. Limitations and failures of energy as a functional area for integration 
 
As we have discussed, the origins of the European Union (rooted in the 
Paris and Rome treaties) are firmly grounded in functionalist theory of 
integration. The process of transfer of authority described by David Mitrany 
in his formulation of this theoretical framework is identical to the pragmatic 
approach proposed by Monnet in his plan for the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC): 
―Sovereignty cannot... be transferred effectively through a formula, only 
through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying 
with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty 
is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of 
such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of 
authority. If that had been the considered process in the domestic sphere, is it 
not still more relevant in the international sphere, where even the elements 
of unity have to be built up laboriously by this very process of patient 
change?‖ (Mitrany, 1966, p. 9) 
This theory, however, is based on the differentiation of governance 
functions into ―technical‖ and ―political‖. Functionalism envisages the 
integration of only the former functions and, therefore, does not require the 
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transfer of political authority to supranational institutions. The character of 
such institutions would be essentially technical, and their tasks, under this 
model, would be to advance social welfare and would theoretically remain 
largely non-political.  
The original proposal for the establishment of the ECSC (put forth by Jean 
Monnet) cantered on the establishment of an international authority, with 
the possibility of legal control only hinted at, and no mention whatsoever 
either of a parliamentary assembly or of a council of ministers. This proposal 
followed closely the functionalist model of integration although Monnet's 
repeatedly acknowledged objective was political integration. Despite of the 
fact that a court, a parliamentary assembly, and a council of ministers were 
added to the institutional structure of the ECSC during the negotiations 
leading to the establishment of the Community, the impact of the 
assumptions underlying the theory of functional integration was significant 
in determining the functional areas chosen, and the character and 
relationship of the institutions of the ECSC. 
Reflecting the fundamental assumptions and beliefs underlying this 
theoretical framework, much of the early hope and effort for the creation of 
supranational structures in Western Europe cantered on the integration of 
the energy industries and policies of European nations. The institutions of 
the ECSC sought to integrate the coal and steel industries and policies of the 
Community‘s member states. These functional areas were chosen because of 
the importance of coal and steel to national industrial and military power, 
and because their resource and industrial base, largely located in the regions 
along the French-German border, had long been contested by the two 
countries. 
The EC framework was extended in 1957 to include the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM). During the time leading to their establishment, EURATOM 
rather than the EEC was viewed as the institutional setting best able to 
become the focal point and promote the process of integration. The field of 
energy in general, and atomic energy in particular, was considered as the 
most solid and far-reaching area for the continuation of the process of 
integration, primarily because of its implications for economic and military 
power: ―The institutional implications of the common market [EEC] are, at 
present, more tentative and less far-reaching than those in the atomic energy 
field...‖ Furthermore, the atomic energy program was considered an 
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―essential attribute of power in the modern world‖ (The Economist, 1955, pp. 
633-634). 
As the chosen functional areas of integration were primarily technical, the 
character of the institutions responsible for initiating and carrying out policy, 
the ECSC High Authority and the EEC and EURATOM Commissions, was 
technocratic. Furthermore, the High Authority had a position of great 
prestige and power relative to the Council of Ministers and, even more so, 
relative to the Common Assembly within the ECSC structure (Urwin, 1991, 
pp. 43-57). These characteristics of the institutions of the EC reflected the 
tenets of the theory of functional integration and, as energy and energy 
policy had been chosen as a primary functional area of integration, they 
paralleled the characteristics of the energy regimes dominant in Western 
Europe during the 1950s. 
Most of the energy industries in the six member states of the ECSC had 
developed into centralized, technocratic, large-scale systems by the end of 
World War II. The energy industries had come to rely primarily on fossil 
fuels—coal and petroleum. This was a consequence of their having to meet 
the challenge posed by the industrial revolution which took place in Western 
Europe during the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
industrialization process required energy systems which could deliver 
increasingly larger and more concentrated amounts of energy. Complex 
technologies were required to extract and utilize these resources, and most 
energy industries came to be dominated by large, hierarchically structured 
organizations, controlled by a technocratic elite. As a result of the strategic 
importance of energy in modern industrial societies, the emergence of 
nationalism resulted in the increasing involvement of national governments 
in the development and operation of national energy industries. These 
developments placed increasing emphasis on the political characteristics of 
energy by making it an important element of the distribution of power, both 
among nations (at the international level), and among social groups (at the 
national level). 
As energy increased its importance as an element of national power and 
prestige, the energy industries were placed outside the market mechanism. 
The energy industries claimed the possession of exclusive technical 
knowledge which would allow them to provide ever-increasing amounts of 
energy at ever-lower cost to the emerging industrial societies of Western 
Europe. Because of these claims, they managed to secure the protection, and 
minimal interference, of the state in each of these countries. Thus, most of 
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Western Europe's energy industries developed into national regimes of 
governance where decisions with far-reaching consequences for the lives of 
large numbers of people were delegated to small technocratic elites. The 
choice of energy as the primary functional area for the pursuit of Western 
European integration required the transformation of national regimes into 
supranational regimes of governance. Importantly, both the justification for 
the functional approach to integration, and the character of the national 
energy regimes, required that the new supranational regimes be controlled 
by technocratic institutions and pursue functions ostensibly technical, but, 
clearly, ultimately political. 
The reasons for the choice of energy in general, and coal and atomic 
energy, as the basic functional area at the early stages of the development of 
the European Community, are discussed in detail above. We have argued 
that the same characteristics which lent this area its apparent appeal, 
rendered it ultimately inappropriate as a functional area for political 
integration. The strategic importance for economic and military power 
assigned to energy and the role national energy regimes had historically 
played in the conflicts among the Western European nation-states meant that 
the political characteristics of these hard regimes predominated and were 
such that promoted conflict rather than cooperation among the Community's 
member states. The dominant national energy regimes were too bound up 
with vital national interests for the member states to allow their integration 
into supranational regimes. Furthermore, the continued prevalence of these 
(hard national energy) regimes continued to precipitate conflict among the 
Community states, posing a continuous threat to the process of integration. 
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